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This collection is the result of a conference on Islam in post-Soviet societies held in the 
summer of 2005 at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle, 
Germany. The conference discussed how Islam has developed and is being practised in 
these societies after the end of 70 years of official Communist atheism. A second aim 
was to explore how an understanding of Islam in this region could benefit from 
comparison with the anthropology of Islam in other Muslim societies. The Muslim 
populations of the former Soviet Union share a common historical experience. Soviet 
state policies towards Islam were relatively uniform throughout the territory of the 
Union. Until the perestroika reforms in the latter half of the 1980s, the majority of 
Muslim citizens were isolated from contacts with the wider Muslim world. Access to 
formal religious education was restricted to a small circle of official imams who studied 
in the two religious training institutions serving the entire country. For others, 
opportunities for Islamic learning were limited to lessons from neighbourhood mullahs 
or female religious specialists, most of whom had little religious training themselves. 
The number of mosques permitted to operate was relatively small and people were 
discouraged from attending them. As a result, the practice of Islam for most Muslims 
was largely confined to the performance of life cycle rituals such as weddings, 
circumcisions and funerals.  
With the break-up of the Soviet Union there was an upsurge in interest in Islam 
on the part of the Muslim populations of all the successor states. In many of the Muslim 
majority republics, such as those of Central Asia, central governments have adopted the 
Islamic heritage of their region as a key element of nation-building projects. What 
unites the experience of Muslims in these societies is the sudden re-emergence of Islam 
into the public sphere, the opening up of contacts with the broader Muslim world, and 
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greater opportunities for studying Islam both abroad and at home in newly opened 
madrasas and religious higher education institutions. As students have returned home 
and as missionaries from Muslim countries have entered the region, people have 
become acquainted with ideas and movements within Islam which have long been 
circulating in the wider Muslim world.  
 The institutional structure of religious administration, a legacy of the Soviet 
period, is another factor common across the Muslim republics. The Soviet Union’s four 
regional Spiritual Boards were responsible for registering mosques, appointing imams, 
and monitoring religious practice. These have been ‘nationalised’, with each republic 
forming its own independent board and religious training institutions. While all are 
formally non-governmental institutions, as they were in the Soviet Union, the extent to 
which they remain under the control of state authorities depends on how tightly 
religious practice is regulated in a particular republic. Thus, the Muslim Board of 
Uzbekistan is much more closely tied to central government than its counterparts in, for 
example, Dagestan or Tatarstan. 
Up to now, analysis of Islam in the former Soviet Union has been principally 
dominated by a concern about religious extremism. A large body of literature has been 
produced by journalists, policy think tanks, and international conflict resolution 
organisations speculating upon the challenge Islam poses to secular governments and 
regional stability. Much of this analysis places Islamic extremism within a volatile mix 
of poverty, water scarcity, inter-ethnic tensions, and repressive local regimes which 
threatens to explode at any moment1. Unfortunately academic studies have not been 
immune to this view. Even if analysis by social scientists tends to be more measured, 
the question of Islam is too often framed in terms of an Islamic ‘resurgence’, evidenced 
by such phenomena as the dramatic increase in the number of mosques, the formation of 
Islamic political parties, and the activities of missionaries from other Muslim countries2. 
Many have discussed whether ‘extremist’ or ‘fundamentalist’ movements have gained a 
foothold in post-Soviet states and whether local populations are likely to be attracted to 
these trends or to remain loyal to ‘traditional’, locally rooted forms of ‘moderate’ 
Islam3. These studies confine themselves to the macro-level of government policy and 
religious movements. When the practice of ordinary Muslims is touched upon, it is 
generally glossed over as ‘traditional’ or ‘parallel’ Islam and left largely unexamined. 
 The study of Islam in both the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet societies has 
suffered from being placed within an overly limiting analytical framework. Before the 
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demise of the Soviet Union this was Sovietology. Within this framework, Islam was 
interesting to Western analysts primarily in terms of the potential threat it posed to 
Communist rule in the Muslim republics4. Research on Islam in the post-Soviet era has 
largely pursued similarly instrumentalist objectives, adapted to fit a changed political 
environment. This analysis is framed within what are ultimately the geopolitical and 
security concerns of the US and Western European governments and therefore fails to 
address the significance for local Muslims of debates and struggles surrounding the 
practice of Islam. It does not shed light on the varied ways in which Muslims in post-
Soviet societies are exploring and questioning what it means to be a good Muslim. 
 What has been largely missing up to now is a nuanced account of how Islam is 
lived ‘on the ground’. We need to look beyond categories such as ‘fundamentalism’ and 
‘tradition’ to reveal the dynamic interactions between the actors in central governments, 
officials within the quasi-state religious administrations, religious groups not sponsored 
by local governments, and the diversity of Muslim believers, all of whom are motivated 
by their individual agendas, interests and beliefs. Most importantly, we need to adopt an 
analytical frame which can accommodate the study Islam in the region on its own terms 
and at the same time place Islam in post-Soviet space within a comparative perspective 
of Islam as practiced in the wider Muslim world.  
 
The study of Islam in the Soviet Union 
Some of the richest ethnographic accounts of the practice of Islam in the Soviet period 
and earlier are provided by Soviet ethnographers. However, the analytical slant of this 
literature was shaped by the necessity of writing in accordance with Soviet state policy 
and Marxist-Leninist ideology. Islam, and religion in general, was assumed to be 
regressive in two ways. It acted to further the interests of exploitative classes by 
concealing the real relations of production5. It was also identified with pre-modern 
societies which Soviet ideologues assumed would whither away naturally with the 
advance of the socialist modernity. Given this ideological straitjacket, it was inevitable 
that the everyday practice of Islam in the period of mature socialism would be viewed in 
terms of ‘traditionalism’. In addition, because of the existence of a quasi-state 
regulatory structure, many Soviet analysts have tended to identify an ‘official’, textually 
‘pure’ Islam which existed within this structure where imams and religious officials 
were formally educated in the central scriptures of Islam. They opposed to this a 
‘popular’, ‘traditional’ practice which existed outside official regulation. 
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 Sergei Poliakov’s analysis of Islam in Central Asia is fairly typical in this 
regard. Although he went against the grain of Soviet scholarship in asserting that Islam 
was not being displaced by a secular, socialist consciousness, he characterises rural 
Central Asia in the late Soviet period as a ‘traditional society’. By this he means ‘the 
complete rejection of anything new introduced from outside into the familiar, 
‘traditional’ way of life’6. He distinguishes between the ‘government Islam’ of the few 
registered mosques, and the vastly more widespread ‘everyday’ Islam. The latter is 
comprised of worship at the large number of buildings which serve as unregistered 
mosques, the veneration of holy sites (mazars), and the various life cycle rituals held by 
families with community involvement. The ‘underground’ imams who officiated at the 
unregistered mosques, the female religious specialists, and the guardians of mazars 
lacked formal religious learning. However, being closer to ordinary people than 
officially appointed imams they exerted a strong influence. Poliakov argues that this 
‘everyday’ Islam regulated daily life in families and neighbourhoods, and generated a 
particular ‘traditional’ way of life. 
 Arising from the association of ‘real’ Islam with the formal learning of official 
imams is a tendency in Soviet scholarship to identify non-scriptural practices as ‘pre-
Islamic’ survivals. Practices described in this way include healing and divination 
undertaken through the medium of spirit beings (usually referred to as shamanism), 
belief in the destructive influence of the evil eye and witchcraft, the production and use 
of protective amulets, and many of the customs and ceremonies connected with life 
cycle rituals7. Thus, what emerge from Soviet ethnographic accounts of Islam are clear 
sets of oppositions; that between the ‘official’ and the ‘traditional’, and between ‘pure’ 
Islam and ‘pre-Islamic tradition’. 
 Studies by scholars outside the Soviet Union often adopted similar dualistic 
oppositions. The concept of ‘parallel’ Islam was most notably developed by the 
Sovietologist Alexandre Bennigsen to mean Muslim practices which took place outside 
the sphere of the Muslim Boards and official mosques8. However, rather than 
identifying these practices with traditionalism, the emphasis is placed on the fact that 
they escaped state regulation and control. As such they potentially posed a threat to the 
authority of the Soviet state. This approach has been followed by others who have 
described how officially established imams attempted to reconcile the tenets of Islam 
with communist ideology and at times acted as spokesmen for the Soviet regime in 
foreign policy matters. ‘Parallel Islam’, on the other hand, was seen as potentially 
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subversive by Soviet authorities9. Yaacov Ro’i’s recently published study of Islam in 
the Soviet Union, one of the most comprehensive such studies to date, similarly adopts 
the categories of establishment and parallel Islam10. 
 There have been a number of criticisms of such a sharply dichotomous view of 
the practice of Islam in the Soviet Union. It has been argued that far from being 
clandestine and outside of state control, unregistered mullahs were in fact supervised by 
officially appointed imams11. Ro’i himself has described the links between the official 
spiritual directorates and unregistered religious practitioners12. Shirin Akiner has 
suggested that Muslim practice be placed on a continuum of shades of belief from the 
affective (for example the wearing of protective amulets) and integrative (celebrations 
which foster communal solidarity) to a spiritual and intellectual relationship with God 
framed by a formal system of belief. She argues that the spiritual, intellectual end of the 
continuum was blocked off for most of the population during Soviet rule reducing Islam 
to a state of primitive superstition13. 
 One of the most interesting criticisms has been made by Mark Saroyan. As well 
as demonstrating that popular practices penetrated into the official space of the mosque, 
and visa versa, he has argued that the Muslim leadership within the official religious 
hierarchy were not mere mouthpieces for the state authorities. He interprets their 
attempts to reconcile the principles of Islam with Communist Ideology not as 
accommodationism but as a counter discourse. By reworking state discourses of the 
‘new Soviet man’ into the ‘new Soviet Muslim citizen’ they attempted to subvert the 
state’s hegemonic argument that religion only served to hamper human progress14. 
Thus, ‘official Islam’ cannot be assumed to be merely state controlled Islam since the 
official institutions encompassed diverse agendas and interpretations of Islam which 
were not always entirely in keeping with the Soviet state ideology.  
 Although these critiques of a stark separation between ‘official’ and ‘parallel’ 
Islam demonstrate how interconnected the two were in reality, they do not entirely 
escape the limitations of the more crude dualistic models. In common with Soviet 
scholarship they fail to take seriously the practice of the majority of Muslims. Lying 
behind the analysis is an assumption of some version of the dichotomy between the 
Great and Little traditions popularised in relation to Islam by Gellner15. They continue 
to relegate non-scriptural practice to the realms of unreflexive tradition. However, if we 
dismiss the local practice of Muslims as mere superstition in opposition to the rational 
belief systems of textual religion, we ignore how they constitute equally coherent 
Introduction 
 6
reflections on the order of the world and the place of humans within it, on concepts of 
morally good action, and on the nature of a person’s relationship with God16. Moreover, 
the category of ‘pure’ or ‘orthodox’ Islam of the Great tradition does not take account of 
the diversity of interpretation within scripturalist Islam itself.  
 
From ‘official’ to ‘traditional’ Islam, from ‘parallel’ to ‘fundamentalist’ Islam 
With the break-up of the Soviet Union there has been renewed popular interest in Islam. 
Since the Muslim republics gained independence, greater freedoms of religious 
expression have been instituted and contacts with the rest of the Muslim world 
expanded. From a situation where Islam was suppressed or at best reluctantly tolerated 
by state authorities, in many of the successor states it has been actively embraced by 
ruling elites as a source of legitimacy for their regimes and as an element in their state-
building projects. However, this does not mean that all interpretations of Islam and all 
forms of Muslim practice have been able to compete on equal terms. Religious 
expression continues to be regulated more or less closely in the different republics 
through the quasi-state Muslim religious administrations. 
For example, in Uzbekistan the Karimov regime promotes Islam as an element 
of Uzbek national culture. A national heritage version Islam, which celebrates the 
achievements of figures in Islamic history who can be shown to have some connection 
with the present territory of the country, is constructed within state discourses17 and 
presented as in keeping with local ‘tradition’ (see the contributions of Kehl-Bodrogi and 
Louw). These include figures such as Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Bukhari, the 9th century 
compiler of the most authoritative collections of hadith, and Baha’ ad-Din Naqshband, 
founder of the Naqshabandi Sufi order. The only form of Islam permitted is that of the 
Hanafi school and a sanitised celebration of Uzbekistan’s Sufi tradition. Any religious 
practice or the expression of ideas outside these narrow bounds is ruthlessly suppressed. 
In the case of Tatarstan and Dagestan in the Russian Federation, the official 
Muslim boards have been appropriated by the leaders of Sufi tariqats (orders) which 
operated outside the official religious administrative structures during the Soviet period. 
The main challenge to their authority comes from reformist movements who promote a 
strictly scriptural interpretation of Islam. They oppose much of local practice as un-
Islamic innovation, reject the existence of hidden or mystical knowledge and divine 
grace accessible only to Sufi shaykhs, and advocate a personal, direct relationship 
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between each Muslim and God through an informed interpretation of the Qur’an and 
Sunna. 
As the political and religious landscape has changed in the ex-Soviet republics, 
the terms of analysis used by those studying Islam in the region have correspondingly 
shifted. However, striking continuities with the studies of Islam in the Soviet period 
persist. While the term ‘parallel’ Islam is no longer widely used, many writers continue 
to construct a dichotomy between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ Islam. The former retains its 
reference to the state, but is now identified with local ‘tradition’, reflecting the fact that 
practice which in the Soviet period was a marker of ‘parallel’ Islam is now being 
promoted by many post-Soviet governments. ‘Unofficial’ Islam as the term suggests 
continues to refer to practice which takes place outside the sphere of the quasi-state 
religious hierarchies. However, these now tend to be identified as ‘fundamentalist’, 
‘Wahahhabi’, ‘Islamist’ or ‘revivalist’. They are described as foreign or alien ideologies 
which were introduced to the region in the last years of the Soviet Union and especially 
since its collapse18. 
This sort of characterisation suffers from the same deficiency as the similarly 
dualistic analysis of Islam in the Soviet Union. In fact, many of those who describe 
Islamic practice in terms of official and unofficial Islam themselves admit that it is often 
difficult to draw a clear distinction between them. Individuals might describe 
themselves as both followers of ‘traditional’ forms of Islam and as reformists who 
disapprove of many local non-scripturalist elements of local Muslim practice. Perhaps 
more importantly, however, the use of terms such as ‘traditional’ ‘fundamentalist’ and 
‘alien’ Islam hinders clear understanding because it adopts terms internal to local 
discourses as objective analytical and descriptive categories. 
The term ‘traditional’ is not value-neutral. It is used as a weapon in the 
ideological and theological debates of different groups in their struggles to define and 
promote their own versions of Islamic orthodoxy. The Karimov regime in Uzbekistan 
promotes its own interpretation of Islam based upon what it constructs as the region’s 
Islamic past. It refers to the ‘Golden Heritage’ (altin meros) of the nation, its Sufi 
tradition and the Hanafi legal school. All other interpretations of Islam are defined as 
‘bad’ Islam, foreign inspired, fundamentalist and extremist, alien to Uzbek tradition and 
spiritual values, and linked to national and international terrorist networks. On the other 
hand, for many groups who promote a scripturalist interpretation of Islam ‘tradition’ has 
negative connotations. It refers to un-Islamic innovation which needs to be expunged 
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from local practice. People who hold such views might be members of Islamic 
movements acting outside the sphere of the official religious regulative structures. At 
the same time they could just as easily be officially appointed imams who frown upon 
the visiting of shrines and the activities of those who heal illness or claim to foretell the 
future with the aid of spirit helpers. In this collection, Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi provides 
an insightful analysis of the dilemmas faced by officially appointed imams in a major 
shrine in Uzbekistan. These imams find themselves caught between their convictions 
that the worship of saints is a form of idolatry, and the necessity of conforming to state 
policies which condones, and even encourages, the visitation of shrines as part of Uzbek 
national tradition.  
By describing a certain category of religious practice as ‘traditional’, those who 
aim to understand the dynamics of Islamic practice are in fact entering into local 
debates about what constitutes ‘correct’ Islam. They are implying the existence of a 
frozen, reified version of Islam which is re-emerging after 70 years of Soviet 
suppression and failing to recognise the fact that the practice of Islam is, and always has 
been, produced within a dynamic process of contestation, change and development. By 
characterising certain ideas and groups as ‘alien’ and ‘non-traditional’ they implicitly 
support parties within this contest which use similar labels to delegitimise competing 
visions of Islam. 
 
An anthropological approach to Islam in post-Soviet societies 
The emergence of Islam as an object of comparative study within anthropology was 
marked by the publication of Islam Observed in 1968, Clifford Geertz’s study of Islam 
in Morocco and Indonesia19. As Robert Launay has observed, prior to this 
anthropologists tended to treat Islam as a textually defined set of beliefs external to the 
societies they studied. Islam was something that was transformed within local practice 
into the syncretic religious forms anthropologists were actually interested in, and the 
study of Islam itself was left to theologians and Islamicists20. This is reminiscent of the 
approach adopted by the Soviet ethnographers I discussed above. Geertz, however, like 
many of those who followed him within the growing field of the anthropology of Islam, 
was concerned with developing an analytical framework which could recognise both the 
scriptural, theological and historical unity of Islam, as recognised by Muslims 
themselves, as well as the diverse manner in which Islam was realised in local practice. 
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The most notable example of this approach within the Soviet and post-Soviet 
context is Bruce Privratsky’s account of Muslim practice in Kazakhstan21. Privratsky 
agues that we should not create a dichotomy between textually pure Islam and practices 
which are labelled pre-Islamic or shamanistic, such as the cult of the ancestors and 
healing with the aid of spirits. Kazakhs themselves make distinctions between different 
forms of religious observance, referring to theological, Qur’anic Islam as a pure ideal 
which is aspired to (taza jol), while the practice of Islam in everyday life is referred to 
as ‘Muslimness’ (musilmanshiliq). These, however, should not be seen as contrasted 
domains but refer to different aspects of religious life. The Islamic ideal is most closely 
approximated by a group within society known as qojas, who claim descent from the 
Prophet Muhammad or specific saints, and by older people. Privratsky uses the concept 
of collective memory as the link between a global Islamic tradition and the heterodox 
complex of Kazakh religious attitudes, which includes the cult of saints and ancestors as 
well as healing cults. Kazakhs feel their religion is legitimately Islamic because it was 
handed down to present generations by their ancestors who followed the path of pure 
Islam, because of the presence within society of the qojas and others who live the pure 
path on behalf of the rest of society, and also the physical presence within the Kazakh 
landscape of the tombs of saints and other religious structures. 
 A problem with this type of analysis, however, is that it suggests the existence of 
coherent, localised formations of Islam, so that there is a distinctively Moroccan, 
Indonesian or Kazak Islam. These accounts do not sufficiently acknowledge the 
diversity of interpretation within a particular society as different groups compete in 
asserting their own vision of ‘correct’ Islam. Moreover, while they acknowledge the 
existence of a wider Muslim world, they do not take sufficient account of the linkages 
between local Muslims and ideas and trends circulating outside the local context. 
Perhaps most seriously, in directing their analysis towards showing that local practice is 
legitimately Islamic, for example that it is the local contextualisation of a global 
tradition22 or the realisation of that tradition within a particular worldview23, they are in 
effect making a theological statement about what should be regarded as Islam24. They 
are in danger of being drawn into local debates and struggles over meaning and 
knowledge in the same way as are analysts of post-Soviet societies who define Islam in 
terms of ‘extremism’ or ‘tradition’. 
 A more productive approach is suggested by Talal Asad. Islam, he argues, 
should be studied as a discursive tradition that seeks to define the correct form and 
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meaning of religious practice. It relates conceptions of an Islamic past with an Islamic 
future through practices, institutions and social relations in the present. Orthodoxy is 
crucial to all Islamic traditions, but orthodoxy is not merely a body of opinion about the 
correct interpretation of Islamic texts. Rather, it is a relationship of power. ‘Wherever 
Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correct practices, and to 
condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones, there is the domain of 
orthodoxy’25. Rather than entering into debates about what can and cannot be 
considered as ‘real’ Islam, anthropologists should instead comment upon the processes 
and struggles through which local actors themselves attempt to define what constitutes 
true Islam and a good Muslim. 
 This has broadly been the approach followed by most anthropologists writing 
about Muslim societies in recent years. They have, for example, studied the discourses 
and struggles over what constitutes proper Muslim belief and practice26, the different 
and competing modes of authority and knowledge27, or they have looked at the linkages 
between local Muslim practice and global ideas and movements28. This is also the 
approach that contributors to this collection have taken with regard to Islam in post-
Soviet space. Sergei Abashin provides a finely grained account of the competition for 
religious authority and influence in a village in Tajikistan in the mid 1990s. He 
identifies different actors in this competition, including those who claim descent from 
the family of the Prophet Muhammad or from Muslim ‘saints’29, a group called 
mahsums who are members of families locally recognised as having a continuous 
tradition of religious learning, and hajjis, a group of villagers who have made the 
pilgrimage to Mecca and have obtained a degree of religious learning and knowledge of 
how Islam is practised in the Middle East. Abashin describes the different means by 
which these actors have sought to legitimate their religious knowledge and authority. 
These included claims to an ascribed, hereditary status, acquired learning, and 
sponsorship of the construction of mosques and other religiously oriented charity. Most 
interestingly, he describes how local competition was intimately linked to national 
struggles taking place at the time between the Communist and Islamic political parties, 
and how Muslim reformist missionaries from neighbouring Uzbekistan were 
incorporated within the religious competition of the village. 
  Vladimir Bobrovnikov also describes the religious politics of a village, in this 
instance a village in a mountainous region of Daghestan. Although the parties in this 
conflict have been described as ‘Sufis’ and ‘Wahhabis’, he criticises the characterisation 
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of the conflict as one between ‘traditional’ and ‘foreign’ or ‘extremist’ Islam. He traces 
the historical roots of the formation of local Muslim communities not to some pre-
Soviet custom but to the process of Soviet collectivisation itself and the local 
administrative structures instituted by the Soviet state. He describes how channels for 
the transmission of religious knowledge have been transformed since the end of 
Communist rule. The memorisation of 19th century lithographs of Arabic texts, which 
had been the dominant form of Islamic learning during much of the Soviet period, has 
been displaced as villagers have been able to perform the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, 
Muslim missionaries have arrived from Turkey and the Arab Middle East, a network of 
secondary and higher institutions of Islamic learning has been developed, and Islamic 
literature in Russian and local languages has become freely available. Bobrovnikov 
gives an account how Islamic reformists have called for the ‘purification’ of Islam from 
what they consider to be non-Qur’anic local customs. They and their opponents both 
claim to represent ‘true’ Islam which they accuse others of having abandoned. The 
reformists in this debate have been labelled as ‘Wahhabists’, after the 18th century 
reformist movement in the Arabian Peninsula, while their opponents have been labelled 
as ‘Sufists’. Bobrovnikov argues, however, that these are pejorative labels employed as 
tools in the ongoing theological debate rather than accurate descriptions of the actual 
practices or affiliations of the parties involved. 
 Most of the contributors to this collection have concentrated upon how struggles 
to define ‘real’ Islam take place among men. Habiba Fathi, however, provides an 
interesting and much needed perspective by showing how this struggle also takes place 
within the religious practice of women. Her contribution focuses upon female religious 
specialists in Uzbekistan called otin-oyi, who officiate at women’s religious rituals and 
provide Islamic education for girls and sometimes boys in their neighbourhoods. She 
describes the historical development of this particular role in Central Asia, and relates it 
to women religious specialists in other Muslim societies. Since the end of Soviet rule, a 
new group of women, who have graduated from religious educational institutions, have 
begun to emerge and are competing with ‘traditional’ otin-oyi in defining ‘correct’ 
Islamic practice. While not all otin-oyi agree with the theological message of these 
‘new’ practitioners, they are nevertheless respected for their skill in the chanted 
recitation of the Qur’an. Fathi also gives an account of the involvement of women 
within the quasi-state religious institutions, and how theological struggles are fought in 
that context as well. 
Introduction 
 12
Kristina Kehl-Bodrogi’s contribution focuses on a contest over the control of a 
regionally important shrine in Khorezm, Uzbekistan, a tomb attributed to the Sufi 
mystic Yusuf Hamadani. On one side of this contest are imams appointed to manage the 
shrine by the national religious administration, who are educated at state registered 
institutions of higher Islamic learning. Opposing them is a group of shaykhs who have 
been ousted from the shrine by the officially appointed imams. These shaykhs base their 
claim to the shrine upon membership of lineages which have historically acted as its 
custodians, receiving the offerings of pilgrims and reciting prayers for them. Both these 
groups act out their competing claims and strategies within the broader context of the 
government’s attempts to construct its own particular vision of national and religious 
identity, within which shrines such as this play an important part. While the officially 
appointed imams might prefer to take firmer action to discourage the veneration of 
saints by pilgrims, a practice they regard as idolatrous, their freedom for action is 
circumscribed by the fact that government ministers and the president himself have 
undertaken pilgrimage to major shrines. Overly active discouragement by the imams 
risks placing them in opposition to the regime’s own discourses. 
Kehl-Bodrogi highlights the effect that the policies and active interventions of 
central government have had on local struggles and debates, something which is evident 
in most of the contributions in this collection. Indeed, the relationship between the state 
and Islam has been an important topic for anthropologists working in Muslim societies. 
Anthropologists have studied such issues as the place of Islam within civil society and 
democratic processes30, the attempts of state authorities to dominate the transmission of 
religious knowledge31, or the effects of state power on the gendered practice of Islam32. 
Anthropologists working in post-Soviet Muslim societies are in a privileged position to 
provide insights into this relationship. While in many Muslim majority countries central 
governments have sought to regulate religious expression and have incorporated 
religious institutions and personnel within some form of state-controlled hierarchy, the 
Soviet Union arguably went further down this road than most. The policies and 
discourses of many post-Soviet governments, and the way these are operationalised by 
state officials and others, continues to have a major impact in defining the possibilities 
and limits of religious expression. 
The first anthropological analysis of this dynamic within the Soviet Union was 
Gillian Tett’s study of a village in Tajikistan during the perestroika period. She draws 
on Nancy and Richard Tapper’s analysis of the Turkish context33 to suggest a gendered 
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division of religious practice. Local practice was shaped by life within an authoritarian 
state which curtailed pubic religious expression. Men were more likely to be engaged in 
the public sphere and state employment and tended to be associated with the 
Communist and modern side of village life. Women on the other hand were associated 
with domestic space and perceived as central to its traditional values. Their performance 
of religious duties and adherence to local ideals of proper female behaviour helped to 
maintain the community’s sense of Tajik and Muslim identity34. 
The effect of state power on Muslim religious expression is the central concern 
of Edmund Waite’s contribution in this collection in which he deals with Islam among 
China’s Uyghur minority. Although China cannot of course be described as ‘post-
Soviet’, the experience of Uyghur Muslims living under the Chinese version of state 
socialism parallels in significant ways the experience of Muslims in Soviet and post-
Soviet Central Asia. As in the Soviet Union, religious expression in China has been 
subjected to periods of active suppression and relative tolerance. Moreover, again 
paralleling the situation in many post-Soviet societies, religious freedoms for the 
Uyghurs were once more restricted from the late 1990s in response to fears of separatist 
and Islamic political movements. Waite analyses how changing state policy has 
influenced the way in which Uyghurs have been able to express themselves as Muslims. 
He argues that the effect of state interventions has been to privilege the memorisation of 
key religious texts in Arabic as the primary means of gaining Islamic knowledge, and to 
reinforce the position of the elders who mediate this transmission. Despite increasing 
trans-national ties with neighbouring states and the increased availability of religious 
literature printed in the regional capital of Xinjiang, state control of the main mosques 
and the imams who manage them effectively prevents those with a reformist agenda 
from openly preaching their beliefs 
The remaining contributions deal with what might be called processes of self 
formation through which individuals explore and negotiate what it means to be a good 
Muslim. Maria Louw describes how Muslims in Uzbekistan re-establish a sense of 
‘normality’ and moral direction in a situation where previous certainties and securities 
have been shattered, and in which they feel helpless and dislocated. Through visiting the 
shrines of Muslim saints, and through dream encounters with these saints, they establish 
a connection with divine knowledge and power which endows them with the agency to 
intervene successfully within a changed world. Saints and their shrines provide a moral 
foundation upon which they can imagine an alternative sphere of being, which restores 
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their sense of themselves as good Muslims. She uses the phrase ‘morality in the 
making’ to convey the sense of how ‘Muslimness’, a local way of being Mulsim, is an 
ongoing process of exploration and negotiation rather than a distinct and reified Uzbek 
version of Islam, even though the post-independence government is attempting to fix it 
in this way. 
Negotiations and debates about what constitutes ‘real’ Islam are not confined to 
distinctively religious sites such as mosques, madrasas, and the shrines of Muslim 
saints. Nor is it only those recognised as religious specialists of one sort or another who 
engage in it. Julie McBrien’s contribution shows that the Muslim public sphere where 
such debates take place can also encompass communal celebrations such as wedding 
feasts, and how discussions which take place in this public sphere feed into the process 
by which individuals construct themselves as good Muslims. She describes the impact 
of a new, religiously oriented form of wedding celebration which is being adopted by 
some households in a town in southern Kyrgyzstan. These new celebrations are 
distinctive in that an attempt is made to conform to what are perceived to be Islamic 
principles. Thus, alcohol is not served, the guests are segregated by sex, and there is 
none of the music or dancing which typically forms a central part of the evening phase 
of local wedding celebrations. A significant innovation is a religious sermon, usually 
given by well known preachers from outside the community. McBrien describes how 
inhabitants of the town explore alternative ways of living a Muslim life through 
attendance at these new wedding feasts, and how they provide a focus for discussion 
within the town about what it means to be a ‘real’ Muslim.  
 Since the restrictions upon religious practice have been relaxed a number of 
new religious movements have appeared in the post-Soviet states. These draw upon 
diverse religious and philosophical sources, but in the Muslim republics many have 
taken on a distinctly Muslim cast. Pawel Jessa describes one such movement in 
Kazakhstan called Aq jol (Pure Way). This movement is founded upon local traditions 
of healing and the visitation of the shrines of Muslim saints, and advocates that 
individuals express their faith in God through developing and maintaining a state of 
spiritual purity. The central ritual of this movement consists of a healing ceremony held 
on Thursday evenings during which the blessings of the ancestors are called down upon 
participants. The movement is expanding as members acquire their personal protective 
spirits, become healers and found their own affiliated groups. Such movements have not 
generally been studied by anthropologists of Muslim societies. This may be because 
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they are not recognised by analysts as being truly Islamic, or perhaps because they are 
not commonly found in the societies they study. However, much of the doctrine and 
ritual of Aq jol derives from Islam as it is practised in Kazakhstan and most of its 
members describe themselves as Muslims. In studying Islam in post-Soviet societies Aq 
jol and new religious movements like it cannot be ignored as they are part of the wider, 
ongoing debate about what it means to be a Muslim. 
 
Conclusion 
This collection advances our understanding of Islam in post-Soviet societies by moving 
the analysis beyond the simplistic opposition between ‘traditionalism’ and ‘extremism’ 
which has long dominated academic commentary. The contributions draw attention to 
the local dynamics of debates about what it means to be a Muslim and explore the 
stakes involved in these struggles. Anthropological studies of Islam in other parts of the 
world have been addressing these issues for some time. They have explored conflicts 
between followers of scripturalist interpretation who seek to ‘purify’ Islam from non-
Qur’anic custom, and those for whom locally rooted practices are integral to their 
Muslim faith and an essential part of their relation to the divine. They have examined 
the influence of global trends and translational movements on local practice. Most 
importantly, they have sought to study the lived practice of Islam on its own terms, 
without prejudging what might constitute ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ Islam. The present 
collection has extended these insights to the study of post-Soviet Muslims. 
A contribution which the study of this region can provide within the broader 
anthropology of Islam is to highlight the importance of exploring not just these 
processes and conflicts themselves, but also the conditions of possibility within which 
Muslims are able to express their faith and engage in debates about what it means to be 
a Muslim. The state, because of its active interventions in the religious sphere in many 
post-Soviet societies, has an important influence on this. The contributions of Waite and 
Kehl-Bodrogi illustrate particularly clearly how government policies and discourses 
directly shape the way in which their citizens are able to express themselves as 
Muslims. However, it is not simply a case of state authorities directing power 
downward upon a less powerful population. Rather, debates of what it means to be a 
Muslim, and struggles to define ‘orthodoxy’, occur within relations of power in which 
participants draw upon multiple persuasive and coercive strategies and resources in 
putting forward their particular views. The coercive capacities of the state are among 
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these resources and can be utilised within the personal projects of actors, both state 
officials and others.  
Abashin’s analysis of religious conflict in Tajikistan is illustrative of this. He 
shows how competition within a particular village between different religious 
specialists is based upon differing claims to knowledge and authority, on kinship 
relations and control of economic capital. At the same time these local conflicts are not 
isolated from national events. The changing fortunes of national Islamic and 
Communist political parties influence local conflicts, sometimes privileging certain 
groups and then others. This is not because central government directly intervenes in 
local processes, but because the shifting national environment alters the possibilities for 
action at the local level.  
In a separate publication35 I have argued that the narrow interpretation by the 
regime in Uzbekistan of what is acceptable Islam, its willingness to ruthlessly suppress 
any form of expression it deems ‘extremist’, and the often arbitrary implementation of 
this policy by law enforcement agencies, has created an atmosphere of vulnerability 
surrounding religious practice. The label ‘Wahhabi’ has come to represent any religious 
expression of which people are unsure, which does not fit into the category of the 
clearly ‘acceptable’, and which might make those associated with it a target for the state 
security services. Parties in local rivalries are able to use the ‘Wahhabi’ label to 
discredit their opponents (whatever their actual beliefs or practice might be), to portray 
them as being a threat to the regime. Thus, the regime’s intolerant and repressive mode 
of engagement is generalised throughout society. 
We need to study the lives of post-Soviet Muslims on their own terms. We need 
to explore the way in which people in this region are constructing themselves as good 
Muslims, the different sources of knowledge and authority they are calling upon in 
doing this, and the relations of power within which this is taking place. Rather than 
taking a position as to what constitutes ‘real’ Islam ourselves, we need to explore the 
conditions under which Muslims themselves are able to ask this question, and the 
different answers they are proposing. 
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